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The over-arching aim of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) of genetic resources is to 
enable fair distribution of benefits between the users (such as universities and biotech 
companies) and providers (such as biodiversity rich countries) so as to both open the 
doors for innovation and create incentives for biodiversity conservation. Access to genetic 
resources is crucial for research related to conservation of plant genetic resources as well 
as R&D for agricultural products and evolved crops that can attain to the new weather 
conditions climate change brings. Therefore, access to genetic resources in general as 
well as benefit-sharing from that access is a key element for sustainable development in 
order to secure research as well as environmental sustainability and resource availability. 
ABS is currently a rapidly developing and evolving field that is shaped by each and every 
implementation of the Parties. This means that the national implementation of the Parties 
determine how ABS goals are realised and how ABS principles find form within regulatory 
mechanisms. These principles are found in international legal documents such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as well as Nagoya Protocol. Additionally, decisions 
and guidelines drafted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity shape these principles that are then to be fulfilled by the Parties when drafting 
their ABS laws by means of implementing regulatory mechanisms that comply with the 
international law. This article reviews 20 provider country’s ABS frameworks as well as one 
regional law with the aim of identifying the common regulatory mechanisms that find place 
in these legal texts. This descriptive approach is then followed by an empirical comparative 
analysis through semi-structured stakeholder interviews in order to identify the most 
beneficial regulatory mechanisms according to ABS experts that belong in four different 
stakeholder groups (provider countries, academic users, industrial users and collections)
Keywords: access and benefit-sharing, Nagoya protocol on access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits, genetic resource, natural product research, utilization
INTRODUCTION
Access and benefit-sharing (ABS) is a system under public international law that aims to fairly 
distribute benefits arising from genetic resources between the users of genetic resources (such as 
universities and biotech companies) and provider countries (regulatory authorities in biodiversity-
rich countries). It is a system that finds its basic principles within the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992). These principles are 
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further specified within the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Nagoya Protocol, 2011). The CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, 
together with the decisions of the Parties thereof, establish the 
international ABS goals. These goals have been explored in a 
previous study by the author (Sirakaya, 2019).
ABS is a rapidly evolving field that is shaped by the 
implementation of the Parties to the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol. This means that the national implementation of these 
countries determines how ABS goals are realized and how ABS 
principles find form within regulatory mechanisms. These 
principles have to be implemented by the Parties when drafting 
their ABS laws by means of putting regulatory mechanisms in 
place which are in line with the international ABS goals. In other 
words, how provider countries regulate ABS directly shapes the 
way ABS principles are implemented.
This article reviews 20 of these national ABS laws and 
a regional ABS law implemented by provider countries 
throughout the world with the aim of describing the different 
types of regulatory mechanisms that provider countries 
use and providing examples of some of the countries that 
utilize them. This descriptive approach is then followed by 
an empirical comparative analysis through semistructured 
stakeholder interviews to identify the approach toward various 
mechanisms on access, benefit-sharing, and compliance 
of ABS experts that belong to four different stakeholder 
groups (provider countries, academic users, industrial users, 
and collections).
METHODOLOGY
The methodology of this article consists of two stages. The first 
stage follows a descriptive approach in reviewing and explaining 
common regulatory mechanisms on ABS. Within this stage, a 
legal analysis of primary sources (national legislation, regulations, 
policies, and guidelines where applicable) within selected 
countries and regions is conducted to explore the commonalities 
and differences provider countries have in regulating ABS 
matters. Once identified, these regulatory mechanisms are 
briefly described and explained. The explanation is then followed 
by a comparative analysis of the selected countries’ and region’s 
related regulatory mechanisms regarding on access, benefit-
sharing, and compliance.
The second stage follows an empirical approach to discover 
and analyze the stakeholder perception on these previously 
identified common regulatory mechanisms on ABS. A qualitative 
analysis in the form of semistructured interviews is conducted 
for acquiring stakeholder perceptions on these mechanisms, as 
well as for demonstrating the qualitative data on stakeholder 
perceptions on them.
The purpose of this article is not to fully describe these 21 
legal documents in detail but rather identify common regulatory 
elements and subjects them to stakeholder interviews.
The choice of the countries subject to this review study is 
made based on the following criteria:
• Richness in biodiversity
• Diversity in terms of economic development
• Diversity in terms of maturity of the ABS framework
• Diversity in signatory status under the Nagoya Protocol1
The selection furthermore aims to demonstrate a worldwide 
approach as there is at least one country in each continent that 
has a state/region with an ABS framework. After applying these 
criteria, the following ABS frameworks have been selected for 
review: Andean Community, Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, France, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Japan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia, Norway, Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam.
Looking into regulatory issues related to ABS, the author 
has identified four key stakeholders: the government (as the 
provider), collections, academic users, and industrial users. 
These have been identified in line with Freeman’s definition of 
stakeholder, which is “any group or individual who is affected 
by or can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives” 
(Freeman and Mcvea, 2001). These key stakeholders’ involvement 
in the regulatory processes is vital to form an ABS system that 
is effective and efficient and that attains the international ABS 
goals (Swiderska, 2001).
OPTIONS IN ACCESS AND 
BENEFIT-SHARING
With the aim of compiling the international ABS principles 
regulated under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol with 
additions from various COP Decisions, the author has 
previously conducted the review of these international 
documents on ABS and compiled 11 ABS goals that are 
prescribed by these documents that are then to be fulfilled by 
the Parties through their national ABS frameworks. These goals 
found through the literature review conducted by Sirakaya 
(2019) are listed as follows:
1) Predictable conditions (Nagoya Protocol Preamble)
2) Legal certainty (Nagoya Protocol Article 6, COP Decision 
V/26, VII/19, VIII/4)
3) Transparency (Nagoya Protocol, COP Decision V/26)
4) Fairness and equity in negotiations (Nagoya Protocol, COP 
Decision V/26)
5) Sustainable use of biodiversity components (CBD Article 
1, Nagoya Protocol Preamble, Article 8, Article 9, COP 
Decisions V/26 and VII/19)
6) Cost-effective measures (Nagoya Protocol Article 6, COP 
Decisions VII/19, VIII/4)
7) Scientific research based on genetic resources (CBD Article 
15.6)
8) Strengthening the ability of indigenous people and local 
communities to benefit from the use of traditional knowledge 
1All of the selected countries are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
yet some of them have not yet ratified the Nagoya Protocol.
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(Nagoya Protocol Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, 21, 22, COP Decision 
V/26, VI/24)
9) Tech transfer and cooperation to build research and innovation 
capacity in developing countries (Nagoya Protocol, COP 
Decisions VIII/4, VII/19, VI/24, V/26)
10) Creating incentives to conserve biodiversity (CBD Article 11, 
COP Decision VI/24, Nagoya Protocol Preamble)
11) Innovative solutions for transboundary situations (Nagoya 
Protocol Preamble and Article 11)
In principle, provider countries’ national ABS frameworks 
should aim to attain these goals by means of implementing 
regulatory mechanisms that aid these goals’ principles. However, 
provider countries can significantly differ in their approaches 
when enacting provisions related to ABS of genetic resources. 
Furthermore, there exists no consensus regarding the state 
practice at the regulatory level. This is because some countries 
choose to enact specific laws on ABS, whereas some regulate 
ABS-related issues under framework legislation related to the 
environment or biodiversity or modify existing legislation to 
include ABS obligations. Nevertheless, similarities can be found 
with regard to the regulatory options that provider countries 
implement within the field of ABS. After analyzing 20 provider 
country approaches as well as one regional approach toward 
ABS, this section compiles the most commonly used regulatory 
options within the ABS frameworks of the provider countries 
into categories of regulatory mechanisms, such as material scope 
(what type of genetic resources are regulated), temporal scope 
(when can the ABS obligations be triggered), activity scope 
(which activities are regulated), geographical scope (within 
national laws, this comes up when regional competence or 
competence based on the type of genetic resource is divided), 
and other types of mechanisms found through the review of 
primary sources (i.e., country legislation on ABS), such as the 
requirement for an access permit (3.1.), requirement for a benefit-
sharing agreement, standardized or negotiable conditions, types 
of monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing found within 
the ABS frameworks (3.2.), and provisions on compliance and 
monitoring (3.3.) (Table 1).
Access
It should first be noted that neither the CBD nor the Nagoya 
Protocol defines access to genetic resources. Furthermore, the 
countries subject to this study either do not define access or define 
it in accordance with their understanding of access. Therefore, 
this study refrains from defining access and claiming either 
approach as the aim of this study is to point out the common 
elements in national regulatory options on ABS.
Options for Material Scope
• In situ access only: A permit or notification is only required 
when access happens within the geographical borders of the 
provider country. This is the classical access case foreseen 
by the CBD, where a researcher takes a sample of a genetic 
resource in a field/forest/nature reserve/public or private land 
(CBD.int, 2011).
• In situ and ex situ access: A permit or notification is required 
when access happens within the geographical borders of a 
provider country as well as through biodiversity biobanks, 
which are collections of biological samples that are held for 
preservation, research, and/or conservation purposes (e.g., 
genebanks, botanical gardens, natural history museums) 
(Shaw et al., 2014). Some frameworks (e.g., Brazil, 2015) 
enable the law to apply retroactively, by choosing to include 
the genetic resources accessed before their legislation came 
into force, within the scope of their ABS framework. This 
means that the material found in collections that were accessed 
before the enactment of the law would still require permit 
from the competent authority of the provider country. Other 
countries choose not to apply such retroactive provisions and 
only regulate the access that happens after the date of entry 
into force of their national ABS framework.
• In situ, ex situ, and access to digital sequence information 
(DSI): Both physical accesses, access through biobanks 
(i.e., collections) and access to DSI, are covered. DSI is 
not defined under the international legal sphere. It has 
been introduced to the Parties to the CBD and Nagoya 
Protocol during COP 13 UNEP (2016a, 2016b). Parties 
to the Convention are currently discussing the possible 
inclusion of access to or use of DSI within the scope of the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol (Laird and Wynberg, 2018). 
For instance, the Andean Community (1996) includes DSI 
within the scope of application.
Options for Mechanism to Trigger Access 
(Temporal Scope)
• Access for sampling: The access requirements are triggered 
before the material is sampled in situ or obtained from an ex 
situ source. In this case, the obligations come into place at the 
moment the user obtains the ability to perform R&D activities 
on the genetic resource. The obligations are triggered prior 
to performing these activities. Kenya (2006, 2013) follows 
this approach.
• Access for utilization: The access requirements are triggered 
after the user obtains the ability to perform R&D. The trigger 
here is not the physical access, which enables the user to 
conduct R&D activities, but rather the utilization activity 
itself. This is the approach taken by the Dominican Republic 
(2018) as it excludes the access of genetic resources by ex 
situ collections, solely for conservation purposes and not for 
utilization or third-party transfer. Brazil (2015) is another 
example of a country that does not place the trigger on access 
but rather on utilization.
• Access to a previously utilized genetic resource for new 
utilization: The requirements are triggered when a new 
utilization activity occurs to a genetic resource that was 
previously made available to the user. France (2016) explicitly 
mentions this in its legal framework.
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It is crucial to keep in mind that having utilization as trigger 
for access does not necessarily mean that all of the genetic 
resources accessed prior to the enactment of the national laws 
are within the scope of ABS obligations.
Options for Utilization Scope
• Research: Access for research activities only. The access is 
only permitted for activities that do not involve any product/
process development.
• Development: This refers to access for product/process 
development.
• Research and Development (R&D): Access for both research 
and development.
Here, it should be noted that the division between research 
and development is yet to be clarified. While the vast majority 
of the countries regulate R&D on genetic resources (e.g., Brazil, 
2015), some countries (such as Ethiopia and Thailand) do not 
include this distinction or define these differences.
Benefit-Sharing Agreement as a Condition of Access
• Mandatory benefit-sharing agreement: This stipulates that a 
benefit-sharing agreement is to be signed between the provider 
and the user prior to access. This is the approach taken by 
France (2016), Thailand (2011), and Vietnam (2017).
• No mandatory benefit-sharing agreement, which means that 
there is no obligation to enter into a benefit-sharing agreement 
prior to access, yet this obligation may arise during different 
stages of R&D. Japan and the Republic of Korea do not require 
a benefit-sharing agreement prior to access.
Options for Regulatory Mechanisms
• Notification-based access: The user is to provide information 
regarding the modalities of access (defining material and 
TABLE 1 | Commonly used regulatory options on access and benefit-sharing.
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Access Scope Material scope In situ only
In situ + ex situ
Access to DSI
Temporal scope Sampling
Utilization
Access to a previously utilised genetic resource for new utilisation
Utilization scope Research
Development
R&D
Pre-condition for access   Mandatory BSA
  Voluntary BSA
Options for regulatory mechanisms   Permit
  Notification
Standardisation   Standardised
  Case-by-case
Benefit-sharing Types Monetary Joint ventures
Access fee
Up-front payment
License fee
Royalties
Salaries and funding
Trust fund payment
Non-monetary Raw data
Research results
Capacity building
Technology transfer
Research directed towards priority needs of the provider country
Food and livelihood security benefits
Trigger   Access
  Utilisation
Standardisation   Standardised
  Case-by-case
Renegotiability   Renegotiable when the user and/or the intent changes
  Non-renegotiable
Compliance Sanctions   Administrative fines in any case of breach
  Criminal sanctions in any case of breach
  Administrative fines for light breach, criminal sanctions for severe breach
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temporal scope, persons/entities involved, transfer, intent, 
access and/or utilization) to the competent authority. However, 
in this case, the user can proceed with the activity without 
waiting for a response. Here, the notification would not qualify 
as a permit because a permit requires the applicant to wait for 
the authorization of the competent authority to commence 
its activities. The Republic of Korea (2017, 2018) is one of 
the countries that only requires notification to the competent 
authority regarding access.
• Permit-based access: Users who want to access a genetic 
resource must apply for access and wait for authorization 
prior to proceeding with their activities. This is referred to 
as the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) under Article 6 of the 
Nagoya Protocol. The majority of the countries have this as a 
regulatory mechanism for access.
Granting Authority
• Centralized, single institution, a one-stop-shop to go for 
the applicant: This is the case where only one authority or 
institution (e.g., a ministry, a research institute, a university, or 
an independent institution) has the competence for the entirety 
of the country and all types of genetic resources. The majority 
of the countries subject to this study have a centralized, single 
institution mandated to grant access to genetic resources.
• Several institutions mandated either according to the types 
of genetic resources or due to regional competence regarding 
genetic resources: In some cases, several regions may have their 
competence on the issues related to genetic resources from that 
region. This is especially the case for federal states. In addition, 
some states choose to have multiple competent authorities 
based on different types of genetic resources. For instance, the 
Ministry of Environment may be mandated to deal with genetic 
resources accessed from national parks, whereas the Ministry 
of Agriculture may be mandated for plant and animal genetic 
resources. Thailand (Thailand, Office of Natural Resources, 
Environmental Policy and Planning, 2014) is one of the 
countries that have several competent authorities depending 
on the type of genetic resource, whereas Spain (2007) has 
numerous competent authorities due to regional competence.
Standardized or Case by Case
• Standardized access conditions prescribed by law, regulations, 
and/or polices: Some countries choose to have PIC as a 
standard contract with predefined terms and conditions for 
access, often accessible through the annexes of the ABS law, 
the regulation, or online. Some countries, such as India, 
(2014), Spain (2007), South Africa (2008), and the Philippines 
(2005), on the other hand, specify the minimum content of the 
PIC within their ABS frameworks.
• Case-by-case conditions depending on the type of access and 
type of genetic resource: Some countries choose to have general 
principles within their regulatory framework on ABS, yet draft 
a unique, bilateral PIC document for each case. In some cases, 
the information required from the applicant is prescribed by 
law; in other cases, the applicant has to contact the competent 
authority to find out what documents are necessary for the 
case in hand. The majority of the countries tend to favor case-
by-case negotiation in their national laws.
Mandatory Local Partner
• The user must apply for a permit with a local public or private 
partner, or the local partner has the responsibility to obtain 
and manage the permit. This local partner can be a university, 
a company, a nongovernmental organization, which, in theory, 
helps the user obtain legal certainty and takes part in the R&D 
activities on the genetic resources subject to the benefit-
sharing agreement. The Philippines, for instance, is one of the 
countries that require a local partner.
• The user can apply for a permit without a local partner. This is 
the approach taken by France and Spain.
Facilitated Access for Non-Commercial Research
• Yes, non-commercial research is subject to favorable access 
conditions compared to commercial research. Favorable access 
conditions can be exemplified as simplified ABS systems for 
non-commercial research, where fewer documents are required 
from the applicant, a permit is given in a shorter time frame, 
or where benefit-sharing is done on non-monetary and/or 
voluntary basis. Australia (2012a), Spain, South Africa, and 
Thailand are some of the countries that have favorable access 
conditions for non-commercial research. Ecuador (2011), on 
the other hand, provides the option of framework contracts for 
non-commercial research.
• No, both commercial and non-commercial research is subject 
to the same conditions. Kenya follows this approach.
Options to Renegotiate ABS Contracts
• Renegotiation when the user changes: In the cases where a 
user transfers the genetic material to a subsequent user who 
is not a party to the contract between the user and a provider 
country, nor it is mentioned in the PIC that third-party transfer 
is allowed, the new user must obtain a new PIC either before or 
after it receives the material from the previous user.
• Renegotiation when the intent changes: In the cases where a 
user’s scope of activity regarding the genetic resource accessed 
from the provider country shifts from non-commercial 
to commercial research and where the PIC does not allow 
such research activity, the user is to then renegotiate the 
PIC conditions with the provider country before or after the 
commercial research activity begins.
For instance, Vietnam explicitly specifies both of these options.
Benefit-Sharing
The explanation below categorizes benefit-sharing types as 
follows. Non-monetary and monetary: Based on whether the 
user pays benefits in monetary value or in actions.
• Mandatory and voluntary: Based on the government’s choice on 
making the benefit-sharing mandatory or voluntary for the user.
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Non-monetary Benefit-Sharing
• Raw data: This type of data could pertain to the core 
information on genetic resource related to its phenotypic 
characteristics. Ethiopia (2006) foresees this type of benefit-
sharing as a part of the obligations foreseen for the access 
permit holder.
• Sharing of research results: There is no indication on what 
research results mean. However, following the daily practice 
of research institutions, we could conclude that this would 
be the reports that describe the results of a research based 
on its methodology (Anderson, 2003). The user would then 
need to provide a report as part of the non-monetary benefit-
sharing obligation. Some countries, such as Australia (2012b), 
and India, further explain which research results would be of 
interest to them.
• Capacity building: At the international level, capacity building 
(or capacity development) is defined as “any intervention or 
activity purposely designed to contribute to the development 
or strengthening of the capabilities of people, institutions and 
systems’’ (CBD.int, 2019; UN.org, 2019). Article 22/4 of the 
Nagoya Protocol includes the following categories within the 
scope of capacity building:
 a) Capacity to implement, and to comply with the obligations 
of, this Protocol;
 b) Capacity to negotiate mutually agreed terms;
 c) Capacity to develop, implement, and enforce domestic 
legislative, administrative, or policy measures on access 
and benefit-sharing; and
 d) Capacity of countries to develop their endogenous research 
capabilities to add value to their own genetic resources.
In addition, Article 22/5 further explains which actions would 
fall within the scope of these categories.
While some countries only mention capacity building as part 
of the non-monetary benefits (e.g., Australia; France (2017); and 
Kenya), some countries, such as South Africa (2008) and Uganda 
(2005), follow a more specific approach by including some of the 
capacity-building activities mentioned under Article 22/5 of the 
Nagoya Protocol.
• Technology transfer: Referring to Articles 15, 16, 18, and 
19 of the CBD, Article 23 of the Nagoya Protocol obliges 
Parties to “undertake to promote and encourage access to 
technology by, and transfer of technology to, developing 
country Parties, in particular, the least developed countries 
and small island developing States among them, and 
Parties with economies in transition, in order to enable 
the development and strengthening of a sound and viable 
technological and scientific base for the attainment of the 
objectives of the Convention and this Protocol.” Some 
countries, such as Costa Rica (1998), take an approach where 
technology transfer is a state obligation embodied in the ABS 
framework, which means that when negotiating benefits, 
the state is obliged to seek out technology transfer options. 
Most countries, however, merely list technology transfer as a 
type of non-monetary benefit-sharing (e.g., Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Vietnam). Some countries, like the Philippines (2005), 
include the terms and conditions of technology transfer in 
their standard ABS contracts. Ecuador’s ABS Framework 
obliges the parties to discuss technology transfer options 
during benefit-sharing negotiations.
• Research directed toward priority needs: The Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization (UNEP, 2002) includes this as a type of non-
monetary benefit-sharing and exemplifies them as research 
related to health and food, taking into account domestic 
uses of genetic resources in provider countries. Some 
countries, such as India and Namibia (2017), list this non-
monetary benefit-sharing option in their ABS frameworks. 
Australia refers to the Bonn Guidelines in their model 
benefit-sharing agreement.
• Food and livelihood security benefits: This category is also 
mentioned under the Bonn Guidelines. It is not defined what 
it covers nor what is entails. Yet, some countries (e.g., India, 
Uganda, and Vietnam) include this type of benefit within their 
list benefits.
Monetary Benefit-Sharing
• Joint Ventures: This Concept Is Not Defined Under the CBD 
or Its Nagoya Protocol, Yet the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1993) Provides Us 
With the Following Definition: “A Joint Venture Is an Association 
of Firms or Individuals Formed to Undertake a Specific Business 
Project.” Most of the Countries Subject to This Study (E.G., 
Kenya, Namibia, Brazil, and India) Refer to Joint Venture as an 
Option for Monetary Benefit-Sharing and Do Not Oblige Parties 
to Enter Into Such Agreements.
• Access fee/fee per sample: This type of benefit-sharing 
occurs when the access obligations are triggered more as an 
administrative fee either per applicant or per sample. Today, 
some countries (e.g., Kenya and Namibia) only mention such 
an option as a type of monetary benefit-sharing within their 
ABS frameworks, whereas some countries (such as Malaysia, 
2017; Vietnam) indicate the types of fees or sometimes the 
amount of fees (India; South Africa, 2012; the Philippines; 
Uganda, 2007) payable prior to access.
• Up-front payments: This concept was initiated in Costa Rica 
through the access-for-fee agreement between the National 
Biodiversity Institute (INBio) and the pharmaceutical 
company Merck (Sittenfeld and Gamez, 1993). The concept 
got furthermore enshrined in the Bonn Guidelines. This type 
of benefit-sharing occurs when the user pays not only for 
the access fee but also for the negotiated amount of benefit-
sharing before utilization. Some of the countries, such as 
India, Namibia, Kenya, and Uganda, list up-front payments as 
a monetary benefit option within their ABS frameworks.
• License fee: There is no unified definition of license fees 
within the field of ABS; however, this type of payment is 
rather common in the field of intellectual property law. 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
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(WIPO), a licensing agreement is a partnership between an 
intellectual property rights owner (licensor) and another 
who is authorized to use such rights (licensee) in exchange 
for an agreed payment, which either comes across as royalties 
or license fees. Royalties are usage-based payments, whereas 
license fees often occur periodically (World Intellectual 
Property Organization, 2004). License fees have been used 
within the field of ABS on several cases. Most of the countries 
(e.g., Uganda, India) mention this as a type of monetary 
benefit option within their frameworks.
• Royalties: Royalties are usage-based payments made by the 
user of a genetic resource to the provider country. They 
are often agreed to as percentages of gross or net revenue. 
Percentages of royalty payments are foreseen both in the 
Brazilian and Costa Rica (2003) ABS systems. The Dominican 
Republic is one of the countries that mention this as a 
monetary benefit-sharing option.
• Salaries and research funding: The majority of the provider 
countries’ ABS frameworks (e.g., Namibia, Kenya, Uganda, 
and Ethiopia) have this included as a benefit-sharing option. 
Although some of them include this under non-monetary 
benefit-sharing, the performance of this act only requires the 
transfer of a monetary amount and thus is suited better as a 
monetary benefit option.
• Trust-fund payment: This is a type of benefit-sharing 
payment made directly to a fund foreseen under the national 
ABS framework. The current ABS Framework in South 
Africa foresees compulsory payment to be made to the 
Bioprospecting Trust Fund after concluding the benefit-
sharing agreement.
Some countries, such as Vietnam, list various benefit-sharing 
options without differentiating between their monetary and 
non-monetary character. Here, it should also be noted that some 
of the benefit-sharing options that can be found under the Bonn 
Guidelines are not included here as they did not exist in the 
majority of the ABS frameworks within the countries that have 
been sampled in this study.
When Will Benefits be Transferred/Trigger for 
Benefit-Sharing
• At the point when access obligations have been triggered: This 
is the case for countries that oblige up-front payments, access 
fees, or fees per sample. The user is then to pay such fee prior to 
or within a specified period after the signing of the PIC.
• At the point of utilization: In this case, the user shares 
the negotiated or predetermined amount or performs the 
activity subject to the agreed non-monetary benefit during 
the R&D process.
India foresees both these options depending on the activity.
• At the point of commercialization: Most countries’ approach to 
benefit-sharing agreements is to negotiate a trigger that is tied 
to the commercialization of the product. Alternatively, some 
countries explicitly mention that they expect benefit-sharing 
at this stage. This option automatically comes across for 
countries that laid down obligations for users to pay license 
fees. Nevertheless, Brazil also follows this approach, despite 
having enacted the mechanism of royalty payments.
• At the point (or a specified period after) the user or provider 
receives first benefits from the utilization of genetic resources 
(GR): The user only benefits (in monetary terms) from 
the utilization only sometime after a product or a process 
developed through the utilization of genetic resources is 
finalized and released into the market. This fact is considered 
in Brazil as the Brazilian ABS Framework foresees the payment 
of 1% of annual net revenue.
• Payment tied to the application of or exploitation of intellectual 
property (IP) rights: This also comes across as milestone 
payments. Milestone payments are the type of payments in 
licensing agreements where the payment is triggered by an 
activity or occurrence of an event (Crama et al., 2009). In its 
model benefit-sharing agreement, Australia (2012), takes the 
exploitation of IP rights into account when establishing the 
trigger for benefit-sharing.
Exemption From Benefit-Sharing
• Exempting the user from benefit-sharing for certain types of use 
(e.g., no benefit-sharing needed when the utilization is directed 
at biodiversity conservation, food security): For example, India 
exempts collaborative research projects (subject to approval 
by the competent authority) as well as non-commercial 
utilization for publication purposes from benefit-sharing. In 
addition, Norway (2016) exempts private and non-commercial 
users from obtaining PIC and MAT for utilizing traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources.
Preset Conditions Versus Case-By-Case Negotiation
• Preset: Benefit-sharing conditions and triggers are set within 
the law, regulations, and/or policies. The user signs a standard 
contract drafted by the provider country. Australia’s ABS 
framework includes a model benefit-sharing agreement, 
whereas Indian ABS Guidelines specify the amount of 
monetary benefits to be shared in specific situations. On 
the other hand, the Brazilian ABS framework specifies the 
percentage of the benefit to be shared based on the annual net 
revenue obtained from a finished product or a process.
• Case-by-case negotiation: Benefit-sharing is subject to 
negotiation between the providers and users. The majority of 
the countries in this study (e.g., Kenya, South Africa, Thailand, 
France, Spain, and Costa Rica) have ABS frameworks that lead 
to case-by-case negotiation for access permits.
Compliance
Sanctions
• Administrative fines in any case of breach
• Criminal sanctions in any case of breach
The Philippines foresees both administrative fines and 
criminal sanctions.
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• Administrative fines for light breach, criminal sanctions for 
severe breach (misappropriation/intentional breach/repetitive 
noncompliance): This is the case for the Republic of Korea.
Other than sanctions, some countries have monitoring 
requirements to ensure compliance. For instance, Thailand 
obliges annual reporting throughout the R&D process, whereas 
Brazil requires notification prior to commercialization. However, 
since these options were not taken on by the majority of the 
countries subject to this comparative study, the options did not 
make it to the interviews.
INTERVIEWS
The stakeholder survey conducted in an initial study by the author 
(Sirakaya, 2019)2 included a question on the participant’s availability 
for an in-depth interview regarding ABS options. Fifty-three of 
the respondents demonstrated their interest, and 20 ended up 
participating to the interview. The distribution of the participants 
among the stakeholder groups has proven to be rather homogeneous 
as five experts represented provider countries, six experts 
represented (public) collections, five represented industrial users 
(from various sectors, such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and 
industrial biotechnology), whereas four represented academic users 
(postdoctoral researchers and professors associated with various 
universities). Written informed consent forms were obtained from 
all of these experts.
The stakeholder interview has been designed in a semistructured 
manner. The questions on access and compliance asked stakeholders 
to rank the preference per regulatory option (Table 2) on a scale of 1 
to 3, with 1 being the most favorable and 3 being the least favorable. 
The questions on benefit-sharing asked the stakeholders to rank 
the impact (from very positive to very negative) and burden (from 
burden to very heavy burden) of engaging in the given monetary or 
non-monetary option.
Perceptions on Access
Question 1 was regarding the contact information of the 
stakeholders. Except for one participant, all of the interviewees 
representing provider countries were a part of the regulating 
body. Two of the provider country representatives were based in 
Africa, and the rest were scattered around the world. Participants 
representing collections were mostly based in the policy division 
of the collections they represented. All of the interviewees 
representing industrial users and academic users were based in 
either Europe or North America.
Due to the confidentiality concerns of the majority of the 
participants, the names of the interviewees will not be published.
2The survey has been sent to over 600 stakeholders including all of the national 
competent authorities of parties to the CBD, all of the national focal points, 
academic institutions, collections, and industrial users worldwide. The selection 
of the stakeholders is based on their function in their institution as well as their 
demonstrated interest in ABS (published articles, their position and expertise, 
attendance to conferences, workshops, or discussions related to ABS). Two 
hundred twenty responses were obtained.
Question 2 asked stakeholders to rank material scope options. 
The majority of the stakeholders opted for ABS frameworks to cover 
in situ and ex situ access, whereas the least favorable option stated 
by the majority of the stakeholders was in situ and ex situ access and 
access to DSI. It should however be noted here that the majority 
of the stakeholders answering as provider countries selected the 
inclusion of DSI as the most favorable option. Nevertheless, three of 
them did not do so. While one of them gave a middle-low score, the 
other two gave inclusion of DSI the lowest score. According to one of 
the latter, the reason for this is that this stakeholder could see that it 
would be hampering research even in the stakeholder’s own country.
Apart from two academic users, all of the user stakeholders 
found the inclusion of DSI the least favorable. One of them stated 
that it would not matter what is included in the scope as long 
as the regulatory requirements are not burdensome for whatever 
is covered in the ABS framework. One of the stakeholders who 
was against the inclusion of DSI suggested this to be handled in 
contracts rather than at the international level. This stakeholder 
argued that it is extremely challenging to define the limits of DSI 
in a unified manner. Another stakeholder from the collections 
argued that at the moment there is no way to track and trace DSI 
and, therefore, regulating it would be “a nightmare.”
The responses of industrial users and collections varied regarding 
their choice of the most favorable option. A stakeholder from the 
collections opted for “in situ access only” as it would be easier for 
collections to provide genetic resources. One of the industrial users 
that chose “in situ and ex situ access” as the most favorable option 
stated that in the sector the stakeholder is familiar with (plant 
breeding), ex situ access would be much more favorable as that sector 
tends to access ex situ rather than in situ. Responses from industrial 
users in different sectors (e.g., pharma) as well as collections and 
academic users also demonstrated different tendencies toward in 
situ versus ex situ access.
Question 3 asked stakeholders to rank temporal scope options. 
The majority of the stakeholders opted for “access for utilization,” 
which meant that they would prefer ABS obligations to be triggered 
at the moment of utilization of the genetic resource. “Access for 
sampling” took second place, whereas “access to a previously 
utilized genetic resource for new utilization” was the least favorable 
option. The preferences of the stakeholders in this question do not 
depend on the stakeholder group they belong in. For instance, where 
some stakeholders from the collections prefer the obligations to be 
triggered at the point of sampling (for it would bring legal certainty), 
others from the collections preferred that these obligations would 
be triggered at the point of utilization (as they believe that it may 
exclude most of the activities of collections). On the other hand, one 
of the academic users claimed that sampling in itself has no value 
and therefore should not be subject to ABS obligations.
Question 4 asked the preference of the stakeholders on 
what constitutes utilization. None of the options (research, 
development, R&D) had a significantly high preference rate as 
the choice of the stakeholders was scattered among all three 
options. Nonetheless, the option of utilization covering “R&D” 
got slightly higher votes than the others.
The vast majority of the stakeholders from collections opted 
for the ABS obligations to be triggered at the stage of research. 
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The majority of the industrial users however found “development” 
to be the most favorable trigger. Neither the provider countries 
nor the academic users opted for an option more than the others.
Question 5 asked the stakeholders whether there should 
be a mandatory benefit-sharing agreement concluded prior 
to access. A slight majority (11 stakeholders or 61%) opted for 
mandatory benefit-sharing agreement rather than a no benefit-
sharing agreement or voluntary benefit-sharing agreement prior 
to access. While all of the stakeholders representing provider 
countries opted for the mandatory benefit-sharing, some of 
the stakeholders that represent users also opted for this option, 
stating that having an agreement prior to access would define 
user obligations and thus help secure legal certainty. Industrial 
users had a higher preference rate toward mandatory benefit-
sharing agreement compared to academic users or collections.
Question 6 on the choice between requiring a notification for 
access against permit for access received varied responses. The 
majority of the stakeholders representing provider countries 
opted for requiring a permit for access, stating it as the only way 
to ensure benefit-sharing. Some of the provider representatives 
however argued that notification could be accepted for either 
local researchers or non-commercial researchers as a whole. Some 
stakeholders representing users stated that permit is the only way 
to ensure legal certainty and to be certain that their access will 
not be challenged in the future. Some of the users, on the other 
hand, stated that the lengthy permit processes create burden for 
research and the bureaucracy that comes with the permit system 
in some cases can jeopardize public health in times of disease 
outbreaks. One of the collection representatives stated that 
notification is enough for monitoring the utilization of genetic 
resources, and the administrative burden that comes along with 
permit processes results in either missing out opportunities for 
research funding or no research at all.
Question 7 asked the stakeholders whether they would prefer 
one centralized competent authority or several authorities based 
on either regional competence or the type of genetic resource. 
The vast majority of the stakeholders stated that they would prefer 
a centralized, single authority for various reasons. First, for it 
would allow better monitoring of genetic resources; second, that 
it would ensure a standardized evaluation process; third, that it 
would minimize disputes and communication problems between 
the authorities; and last, it would bring down transaction costs 
for both parties (the costs for users to evaluate applications and/
or monitor genetic resources as well as costs for users to obtain 
access to genetic resources).
The preference on question 8, which asked stakeholders their 
thoughts on standardized or case-by-case conditions on access, 
had the highest score supporting case-by-case conditions by 
slight majority. Nevertheless, all of the stakeholders that opted for 
the case-by-case conditions stated that the ideal situation would 
be standardized terms that have the flexibility to be adapted to a 
specific case. Some of the stakeholders who chose standardized 
conditions also stated that they would prefer a model contract 
that can be tweaked to meet the needs of the case, type of genetic 
resource, and type of access.
Question 9 asked stakeholders to pick between an ABS framework 
requiring a local partner prior to access and an ABS framework 
that either does not require such a condition or encourages it on 
a voluntary basis. The majority of the stakeholders opted for the 
latter. Not all provider country representatives were supportive of 
mandatory local partners. One of the provider country stakeholders 
expressed the need for capacity development for nominating local 
partners who can successfully handle such a task. This stakeholder 
further argued that most providers do not have such capacity. One 
of the stakeholders representing industrial users stated that small 
companies would also not be able to handle such a mandatory 
requirement. A stakeholder from collections argued that local 
partners are only beneficial for long-term projects, and such long-
term partnerships can help develop capacity in provider countries, 
yet would only be a burden in short-term efforts.
TABLE 2 | Stakeholders’ preference on access.
Material 
scope
Temporal
scope
Utilization 
scope
Preconditions Regulatory 
mechanisms
Granting
authority
Standardization Mandatory 
local 
partner
Facilitated 
access
Renegotiability
Providers In situ, 
ex situ, 
and for 
DSI
Access for 
utilization
Development Mandatory 
benefit-sharing 
agreement
Permit-based 
access
Centralized 
single 
institution
Case by case Mandatory 
local 
partner
Facilitated 
access for 
non-commercial 
research
Renegotiable 
when user and 
intent change
Academic 
Users
In situ 
and 
ex situ 
access
Access for 
sampling
and 
access for 
utilization
Development No mandatory 
benefit-sharing 
agreement
Notification-
based access
Centralized 
single 
institution
Case by case No 
mandatory 
local 
partner
Facilitated 
access for 
non-commercial 
research
Renegotiable 
when user and 
intent change
Industrial 
Users
In situ 
and 
ex situ 
access
Access for 
utilization
Development Mandatory 
benefit-sharing 
agreement
Notification-
based access
Centralized 
single 
institution
Standardized 
and case by 
case1
No 
mandatory 
local 
partner
Facilitated 
access for 
non-commercial 
research
Renegotiable 
when user and 
intent change
Collections In situ 
and 
ex situ 
access
Access for 
utilization
Research No mandatory 
benefit-sharing 
agreement
Notification-
based access
Centralized 
single 
institution
Standardized No 
mandatory 
local 
partner
Facilitated 
access for 
non-commercial 
research
Renegotiable 
when user and 
intent change
1There was no consensus among industrial users regarding this option.
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Question 10, which asked whether the stakeholders would 
prefer an ABS framework that provides facilitated access to 
non-commercial research as well as other types of research 
addressed under Article 8 of the Nagoya Protocol, the vast 
majority chose the provision of such access. A collections 
representative defined facilitated access as fewer, simpler 
conditions where the non-commercial user can agree to share 
useful information related to the genetic resource with the 
provider country. An academic user representative stated 
that facilitated access would entail clear information on when 
and with whom the provider will need renegotiation in case 
of commercial exploitation. One of the provider country 
representatives stated that such facilitated access should 
especially be given to foreign researchers as they require 
additional assistance in accessing genetic resources compared 
to their local colleagues.
Preferences on Benefit-Sharing
Questions 11–20 asked stakeholders how they perceive the 
impact and burden associated with several monetary and non-
monetary benefits. These questions furthermore gathered 
insights from stakeholders regarding their preferences on the 
triggers and timing for benefit-sharing and the format and the 
mandatory nature of the benefits.
Non-monetary Benefits
Sharing Raw Data
The majority of the industrial users found sharing of raw data to 
be rather an ambiguous benefit-sharing option and a burdensome 
one. The majority furthermore exclaimed that the definition of 
raw data and what it entails are not clear. A way to encourage this 
is by giving the industry the choice of sharing it versus sharing 
other types of benefits.
Almost all of the interviewees from the collections were in 
favor of sharing raw data. The majority stated that generating 
data on genetic resources and making such data publicly available 
are highly beneficial for the collections and research dedicated to 
conserving biodiversity.
The vast majority of the interviewees from the provider 
countries stated that receiving raw data has a very positive 
impact. They however stated that there is some level of burden 
associated with it. Some of them stated that this burden comes 
from ensuring confidentiality to the data, and some of them 
stated that finding the right institution to share the data with to 
comprehend and make use of it is often challenging.
All of the academic users stated that sharing raw data 
would have a positive impact as academic researchers are also 
appreciative if the amount of publicly available raw data would 
increase. Some of them also argued that the term is rather 
ambiguous, and it should be standardized, or at least defined.
Sharing Research Results
The industrial users found sharing of research results to be a 
better option than sharing raw data. Yet, they stated that some 
burden is derived from inserting the research results into a usable 
format that is reader-friendly and is easy to disseminate.
The interviewees from the collections were all in favor of 
sharing research results as a type of benefit. They found it to have 
a very high positive impact also for their sector and stated that 
dissemination does not have much burden associated with it as it 
is one of their core activities.
Interviewees from provider countries found this option to be also 
highly beneficial for them, yet they stated that making sense of the 
results and being able to utilize them bear equal amounts of burden.
Academic users also expressed that sharing of research results 
is highly beneficial for them, and since it is their regular activity, 
such a benefit-sharing option would not be burdensome.
Capacity Building
The majority of the industrial users stated that this would 
have a relatively high positive impact, and the burden of 
executing such a benefit-sharing activity would not outweigh 
its impacts, whereas the majority of the interviewees from the 
collections stated that building capacity in provider countries 
has a highly positive impact both for the country and for the 
collections. They stated that capacity building helps establish 
more sustainable relationships with provider countries and 
also helps collections to ease into access procedures as mutual 
trust gets built.
This type of benefit-sharing is perceived by the majority of 
provider country participants to have a high positive impact. 
Some of the stakeholders argued that this would be the most 
important type of benefit-sharing as it would allow provider 
countries to valorize their own genetic resources, which they 
saw as the true meaning of the international ABS framework. 
However, they admitted that it would bear some limited amount 
of burden in ensuring that these activities would be received by 
the people who can utilize them.
While academic users stated that capacity building has a 
positive impact, they also argued that it has an equal amount of 
burden as the execution of capacity-building activities requires a 
relatively high amount of resources.
Technology Transfer
The interviewees representing the industrial users stated that 
this type of benefit-sharing has a high positive impact for 
them. Some perceived this to also have a positive impact for the 
provider country. Some argued that their scope of activities in 
conducting R&D with genetic resources results in a product or 
process that is a technology transfer activity in itself. Most of 
them also stated that technology transfer involves a limited to 
high amount of burden.
Likewise, the vast majority of the interviewees representing 
the collections found this to have a very positive impact. They 
added that compared to capacity building, technology transfer is 
a bit more burdensome.
Provider country participants stated that technology transfer 
is rather beneficial for them. However, learning and teaching how 
to make use of technology can sometimes be rather burdensome. 
Furthermore, the majority stated that not all technology they 
received was useful for them.
The majority of the academic users found technology transfer 
to have a lower amount of positive impacts than capacity building, 
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stating that often they are not allowed by their research partners 
to engage in such an activity.
Research Directed Toward Priority Needs of the 
Provider Country
The vast majority of the industrial users were in favor of this 
benefit-sharing option. One of them underlined that this would 
be the best approach for his sector as benefits would directly 
return to the people who need them. Yet, the majority agreed on 
it as a heavy burden because making sure the research precisely 
helps the provider country would require a considerable amount 
of resources.
While the majority of the interviewees representing collections 
stated that this would generate positive impact, some of them 
expressed concerns for this option, stating that the collections are 
extremely constrained at the type of research they can engage in, 
and therefore, they would not always be able to secure funding 
for such benefit-sharing.
The majority of interviewees representing provider countries 
stipulated that this is rather a minimally burdensome type 
of benefit-sharing with a high positive impact. One of the 
interviewees stated that provider countries regularly look into 
research gaps, and identifying the ones that could be filled by 
benefit-sharing would constitute limited burden.
The vast majority of academic users stated that this benefit-
sharing option fits within their scope of activities, and therefore, 
they would be able to maximize the positive impacts of 
conducting such research.
Food and Livelihood Security Benefits
This option was perceived as beneficial by the majority of the 
industrial users. While acknowledging the positive impacts 
of food and livelihood security benefits, some interviewees 
stipulated that this type of benefit-sharing often does not have 
a connection with the utilization of genetic resource itself and 
that many industrial users engage in this type of benefit-sharing 
regardless of having accessed genetic resources from that country.
The responses from interviewees representing collections 
were rather varied. Some of them claimed that this type of 
benefit-sharing does not fit within their sector’s scope of work, 
while others claimed that they have engaged in benefit-sharing 
activities that would be considered as food and livelihood 
security benefits. However, the majority argued that the burden 
of engaging in this option would outweigh the positive impacts.
Interviewees representing provider countries found this 
option to be the least impactful in terms of its positive effects 
for them, among other non-monetary benefits. One of the 
interviewees stated the reason for this as not being applicable to 
all of the regions or all of the provider countries. Nevertheless, 
the majority stated that the burden of receiving such a benefit 
would be minimal.
The interviewees representing academic users were not in 
favor of this option for their sector. While admitting it would 
still generate a limited amount of positive impact for them, 
it would also result in a heavy burden as this type of benefit-
sharing is not something that they are used to see within their 
scope of activities.
Monetary Benefits
Joint Ventures
Almost all of the interviewees from industrial users stated that 
this would create a negative impact for their sector resulting 
also in very heavy burden. Some of the interviewees argued 
that, in some cases, a joint venture might work, but in any case, 
it should be a voluntary choice and not be imposed as a benefit-
sharing clause.
The majority of the collections representatives stated that this 
option would constitute a very negative impact and even heavier 
burden. Some of them claimed that this type of benefit-sharing 
would only be relevant for applied research,3 yet they stated 
that the burden of keeping that joint venture functional would 
outweigh any positive impact.
While the majority of the provider country representatives 
stated that there could be potential positive impacts deriving from 
a joint venture, they also stated that the cost of establishing and 
sustaining such an initiative would outweigh all potential benefits.
The majority of the academic users perceived this to have a 
positive impact. One of the interviewees claimed that this would 
give researchers a chance to work with local strains alongside 
local researchers that have knowledge on them.
Access Fee per Sample
Almost all of the interviewees from industrial users stated that 
such a benefit-sharing option would create negative impacts for 
their sector, arguing that it is not a realistic approach as most 
sectors work with thousands of genetic resources at the same 
time. Some claimed that this would be impossible for small and 
medium enterprises and start-ups as the cost of access would 
start impacting the R&D process from the first step of the value 
chain onward.
All of the interviewees representing collections stated that 
this option would result in very negative impact and very heavy 
burden, arguing that collections do not have the budget to pay 
such a fee for each access.
While the overall result points out to a positive impact for 
provider countries, some interviewees argued that this would not 
be a satisfactory approach as they stated that the price paid for a 
sample would not constitute benefit-sharing.
Even though the overall result is a positive impact for academic 
users, some remained skeptical about this option.
Up-Front Payments
For similar reasons to access fee per sample, the majority of 
industrial users found this option to have negative impacts and 
heavy burden for their sector. They argued that benefit-sharing 
at the beginning of the activity would be a huge drawback as it 
discourages R&D.
All of the interviewees representing collections stated that 
up-front payments would result in very negative impact and 
3 Upon receiving this response, these interviewees were asked to clarify the 
difference between basic/fundamental research and applied research. All of them 
agreed that there is no clear line between where one ends and the other begins. 
One of them stipulated that it is not possible to realistically talk about fundamental 
research today, since even for a single research funding, scientists need to talk 
about valorization, innovation, and end result.
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very heavy burden. While agreeing with others, one of the 
interviewees stated that it might be interesting to share benefits 
up front if track and trace requirements would be removed by it 
and that the users would not have to worry about benefit-sharing 
at later stages.
The majority of provider country representatives perceived 
up-front payments to have a very positive impact in terms of 
being able to secure benefits from the starting point and being 
able to have less burden regarding enforcement and compliance.
The academic user interviewees did not have detailed opinions 
on this option. However, one remained skeptical, arguing that 
sharing monetary benefits from the get-go would negatively 
affect academic research.
License Fee
The responses from industrial user interviewees range from 
negative to very negative impacts as well as from heavy burden 
to very heavy burden. One of the interviewees argued that it is 
currently ambiguous what triggers sharing benefits as license 
fee. Another interviewee argued that license fees create a lot of 
administrative burden, which far outweigh positive impacts.
On the other hand, the vast majority of collections stated 
that this would not apply to them as collections do not engage 
in commercial activities with genetic resources. However, they 
claimed that if this would be applicable, it would create very 
negative impact and burden.
The responses from provider country representatives 
ranged from positive to very positive impacts, while burden 
was perceived to be limited. However, one of the interviewees 
opposed to it, arguing that imposing license fees would result in 
a lot of track and trace activities that create a heavy burden.
Although the majority of academic users perceived this 
benefit-sharing option to result in positive impacts and 
limited burden, they also refrained from clearly elaborating on 
the reason.
Royalties
The industrial user interviewees’ responses did not create a 
consensus on the impact of royalties for their sector. One of the 
interviewees argued that royalties would be burdensome in terms 
of the administrative work it requires.
The collections mostly stated that this type of benefit-sharing 
does not have an impact nor a burden for their sector as they do 
not engage in commercial research.
The majority of provider countries were in favor of this 
option as they stated that it would create a very positive impact. 
Yet, most of them argued that the administrative burden of 
establishing a system to organize receiving this benefit type 
would constitute a heavy burden. One of the interviewees 
stipulated that royalties acknowledge the provider country’s 
efforts to conserve biodiversity and create a good return 
on investment.
The majority of the academic user representatives did not 
have strong opinions against royalty payments. Some claimed 
that universities are prepared to execute such payment. Another 
one stated that collections may require a different type of benefit-
sharing scheme, as this interviewee perceived collections’ work 
as already a type of non-monetary benefit-sharing in terms of 
biodiversity conservation.
Salaries and Research Funding
Among all of the other monetary benefit options, interviewees 
representing industrial users were in favor of this option the 
most. One of the interviewees argued that this type of benefit-
sharing would go to the people who really need them, and 
another argued that this is a very useful option for strengthening 
the sector’s relationship with the provider country as they would 
be directly able to see the benefit that flows through the R&D on 
genetic resources.
Although the interviewees stated that the collections would 
have the least amount of burden in performing this benefit-
sharing option, the majority still argued that collections do not 
have the capacity to provide such funding.
Provider countries did not favor this option as much as the 
latter two options. They stated that they would rather prefer 
funding for research, students, and capacity-building programs.
The majority of the academic users stated that they see this 
type of benefit-sharing (especially funding for PhD researchers) 
as one of their routine activities, and therefore, this would create 
minimal burden.
Trust Fund
The interviewees did not have a consensus on neither the impact 
nor the burden of this option. While some industrial users were 
indecisive about the effects it could have for their sector, some 
perceived it to be very beneficial.
Most of the interviewees from collections claimed that it 
would have no impact as they perceived that they would not be 
engaging in this type of benefit-sharing since they do not engage 
in commercial research. Some stated the benefit of a trust fund 
in terms of removing the burden of track and trace from both the 
user and the provider country.
Provider countries’ responses ranged from positive to very 
positive. According to one of the interviewees, a trust fund 
would help better organize benefit-sharing and transparency of 
transactions while enabling the provider country to reduce the 
cost of compliance checks.
Likewise, the majority of academic users were in favor of this 
option in terms of its potential to also simplify access for researchers.
Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Mandatory benefit-sharing was the dominant option for 
industrial users. One interviewee held that the industry would 
prefer mandatory benefit-sharing to ensure legal certainty. 
Another interviewee argued that the ideal option would be 
making benefit-sharing mandatory yet allowing users to pick 
between monetary and non-monetary.
For collections, the answers were two-fold. Half of the collections 
claimed that to ensure legal certainty, mandatory benefit-sharing is 
key while the other half argued that many of the benefits arising 
from collections work cannot be predicted in advance and may be 
delivered over decades; a flexible system is more suited.
All of the interviewees representing provider countries 
preferred mandatory benefit-sharing. However, one stated that 
Balanced Options for ABSSirakaya
13 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1175Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org
it should be voluntary for local researchers. One interviewee 
claimed that his experience suggests voluntary benefit-sharing 
amounts to no benefit-sharing.
Only one of the academic users showed a tendency toward 
favoring mandatory benefit-sharing, arguing that provider 
countries will not be satisfied with a voluntary structure. The rest 
claimed that voluntary benefit-sharing would enable academic 
research to proceed.
Preset Versus Negotiated Conditions
For industrial users, the responses were two-fold. While the one 
half argued that small/medium enterprises (SMEs) would not be 
able to have resources to negotiate benefit-sharing agreements, 
the other half argued that everybody, including SMEs, has 
the means in its R&D budget to negotiate, and sometimes the 
flexibility provided by negotiation serves SMEs better. The former 
group furthermore argued that negotiating benefit-sharing each 
time an access happens bears too many transaction costs for both 
the user and the provider.
All of the interviewees representing collections were in favor 
of preset conditions as long as they would have some level 
of flexibility.
Provider countries’ responses were not in unison. While some 
claimed that preset conditions would be very beneficial in terms 
of reducing transaction costs, some stated that not all cases would 
benefit from such an approach.
The majority of academic users also opted for preset 
conditions. Some stated that they should be flexible enough to be 
adapted to the case in hand and should not be hindering R&D.
Trigger for Benefit-Sharing
The majority of industrial users preferred sharing benefits some 
time after the user benefits from utilization of genetic resources 
(e.g., after the product has been in the market for a year).
While some interviewees stated that this should be access for 
collections as collections do not engage in commercialization 
activities, some claimed that it is better to have the trigger as late 
as possible.
The vast majority of provider countries were in favor of the 
trigger to be at the point of access, stating that this is the only way 
to secure benefits and arguing that track and trace for provider 
countries is almost impossible.
Most of the academic users preferred the trigger to be 
commercialization, stating that academic research should not 
be bound by benefit-sharing obligations if there is no applied 
research that follows after.
Perceptions on Compliance
Question 21 asked stakeholders their opinions on sanctions. The 
majority of the stakeholders preferred administrative fines for 
light breach, criminal sanctions for severe breach, while the least 
preferred option was criminal sanctions for all kinds of breach. 
Industrial users stated that they would prefer not to access genetic 
resources from countries that have criminal sanctions, especially for 
all kinds of breach. Academic users and collections stated the same 
regarding research activities. The majority of the provider countries 
emphasized the need to create proportionate sanctions.
CONCLUSION
This study identified common regulatory options implemented 
by provider countries when regulating their ABS matters. 
Regarding access, the author identified 25 options on access and 
6 non-monetary and 7 monetary benefit-sharing options that are 
common to the provider countries’ legislation subject to this study.
While describing the options, the research demonstrated 
some ambiguities regarding the definition and scope of 
some terms related to benefit-sharing. For instance, it 
was not possible to fully identify what constitutes sharing 
raw data, research results, or food and livelihood security 
benefits. Neither the international legal framework (CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol) nor the COP Decisions prescribe 
what these benefit-sharing types exactly consist of. On the 
contrary, non-monetary benefit-sharing options, such as 
capacity building and technology transfer, are explained in 
detail at the international level. This comparative analysis 
furthermore noted that most of the ABS frameworks of the 
African countries subject to this study listed some benefit-
sharing options within their legislation or annexed to the legal 
document without further describing them. It was noted that 
the majority of these options were identical to the options listed 
in COP Decision VI/24, also known as the Bonn Guidelines, 
which is the most detailed ABS guideline at the international 
level that got drafted before the Nagoya Protocol came into 
force. Although this seems to be a beneficial approach in 
terms of the national ABS frameworks’ compatibility with the 
international ABS principles, the interview with stakeholders 
further demonstrated that neither the regulators nor the users 
exactly know what actions some of these benefit-sharing 
options entail.
Moreover, the comparative analysis demonstrates that, 
apart from some (such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and the 
Philippines), the provider countries’ laws often do not expressly 
mention the trigger for benefit-sharing, meaning that the users 
would not be able to directly comprehend when they would 
need to share benefits. When this information is analyzed 
together with the data gathered from the provider country 
representatives during the interviews, we may think that this is 
perhaps because the majority of the provider countries opt for 
benefit-sharing at the point of access and that they presuppose 
the benefit-sharing will anyhow happen right after the PIC is 
granted and the mutually agreed terms (MAT) negotiated. This 
perception however needs to be tested in further detail.
The data related to access gathered during the stakeholder 
interviews lead to several conclusions. First, while the majority 
of the users do not favor the inclusion of DSI within the 
material scope, the majority of the provider countries do. This 
of course does not come as a surprise; however, an interesting 
point noted during the discussions is that even some of the 
provider country representatives admit that the inclusion 
would likely hamper the research, also for the local researchers 
in provider countries.
Regarding the activity that is included in the material scope, 
the participants agreed that the definition of utilization and the 
activities covered are yet to be clarified.
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They perceived that only commercial utilization would require 
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It is also possible to see that both the users and provider 
countries still look for solutions to reduce transaction costs. The 
majority believes that multiple competent authorities in a country 
result in a lack of clarity and increase transaction costs, while most 
support facilitated access for basic research. However, some of the 
participants argued that the separation between basic and applied 
research is becoming increasingly complex. During the interviews, 
users in general repeatedly stated that complying with some ABS 
laws has proven to be especially difficult for non-commercial 
research and SMEs as the system is rather costly for them.
While some of the interviewees were not yet sure what to think 
of channelling benefits into a trust fund, the majority argued that 
such a benefit-sharing option would enable both the providers 
and the users to save on monitoring costs and that such a system 
could bring transparency into benefit-sharing. The stakeholders 
had a similar opinion regarding preset conditions for benefit-
sharing. Although there is still no consensus on whether preset 
conditions would work, some stakeholders saw the benefit of 
them in terms of reducing transaction costs.
The results indicate a clash of opinions between provider 
countries and industrial users. Regarding benefit-sharing, where 
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Provider countries and industrial users do however feel the 
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instance, both agree that capacity building is a very beneficial 
option with minimal burden. Likewise, they both agree with the 
fact that benefit-sharing should be mandatory. The majority of 
the industrial users expressed that the provider countries would 
not be satisfied with a voluntary benefit-sharing approach.
Apart from academic users, all of the stakeholders agreed that 
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is the way other stakeholders perceived joint ventures as such). 
For academic users, it seems that joint ventures indicate research 
collaborations with local institutions in the provider country.
While this study provides clarity to the perceptions of 
stakeholders on regulatory mechanisms commonly implemented 
by provider countries, further study is required both for finding a 
common ground between provider countries and industrial users 
and for a systematic analysis of each regulatory option’s capacity 
to attain the international ABS goals. After all, a balanced ABS 
system would be associated with trust while dissociated with 
ambiguity and complexity.
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